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Originally, the safe harbor defense exclusively applied to “margin payments made by 
commodities clearing organizations.”5 However, the nature of the financial markets became 
increasingly complex and the issues that emerged became more difficult to handle; therefore, 
Congress needed to broaden the safe harbor defense’s scope to encompass the newly emerging 
complexities.6 Through the enactment of section 546(e), the safe harbor defense’s scope was 
broadened to expand its protections “beyond the ordinary course of business transactions to 
include margin and settlement payments to and from brokers, clearing organizations, and 
financial institutions.”7 Ultimately, Congress sought to prevent catastrophic risks to the financial 
markets and to thwart spiraling effects that may ensue from unwinding certain security 
transaction.8  
Regardless of the uncertainties about when to utilize the safe harbor defense and what 
limitations should be imposed, Congress has been reluctant to clarify the outer limits of the safe 
harbor defense.9 Essentially, these issues have become problematic for judges when trying to 
determine whether permitting a party to assert the safe harbor defense is appropriate.  
 Section 546(e) has been amended throughout the years, which has enhanced the 
difficulties that emerge when a party asserts the safe harbor defense.10 In 2005, the scope of the 
term “securities contract” was significantly broadened to encompass various types of securities 
transactions.11  Further, in 2006, section 546(e) was amended by the Financial Netting 
                                                
5 See Warren, supra note 2.  
6 See id.  
7 See id.  
8 See Daniel J. Merrett and Danielle Barav-Johnson, Taking Stock: United State Supreme Court 
Presented with Opportunity to Settle Meaning of Section 546(e), NORTON J. BANKR. L. AND 
PRAC. (2016). 
9 See id.  
10 See Warren, supra note 2. 
11 See id.  
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Improvements Act to exclude from avoidance “transfers made in connection with a securities 
contract, commodity contract or forward contract.”12    
 Throughout this memo, I will address what the safe harbor defense is, pursuant to section 
546(e), and explain when such a defense may be asserted.  In addition, I will discuss the caveat 
created between the safe harbor defense and 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A)13, and I will address the 
safe harbor defense’s limitations when actual knowledge of fraud can be established.  
I. What is the “Safe Harbor” Defense?   
Section 546(e) provides that a debtor or a “trustee may not avoid a settlement payment or 
transfer made by or to a commodity broker, financial institution, financial participant or 
securities agent.”14 The safe harbor defense may extend to any avoidance action pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548(a)(1)(B) & (b)15 of the Bankruptcy Code.16  However, the safe harbor 
defense limits the powers of a trustee or a debtor to avoid certain types of transfers, unless these 
transfers were made with the actual intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud creditors” pursuant to 
section 548 (a)(1)(A).17 Further, a trustee may not avoid a “settlement payment” as a preference 
or a constructive fraudulent transfer.18 The ultimate purpose of the safe harbor defense is to 
protect the financial markets from instability caused by the reversal of already settled securities 
transactions.19  
                                                
12 Id.  
13 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).  
14 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).  
15 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012); 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) & (b).  
16 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).  
17 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1)(A).   
18 See Craig M. LaChance, Major Event Litigation: Madoff Securities Fraud Litigation Under 
Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78aaa et seq., AM. LAW REP. (2015).   
19 See 3A BANKR. SERV. LAW. EDITION § 32:199 (Apr. 2017).   
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A transfer may qualify for the safe harbor defense even if the financial institution is 
merely a conduit.20 Typically, the section 546(e) safe harbor is available to protect a settlement 
payment when a transferee can prove that the payments he or she received were settlement 
payments made by the stockbroker.21 However, generally, a court will not allow for such a safe 
harbor defense when there is systemic fraud since fraudulent transactions are not commonly used 
in the securities industry and section 546(e) specifically excludes “actual fraudulent transfers” 
from the safe harbor defense.22   
Generally, the safe harbor defense will apply to both publicly traded securities, as well as 
nonpublicly traded securities.23 But such a defense will not apply unless a security is involved.  
See id.  Therefore, the safe harbor defense will not apply to the “acquisition of assets, dividend 
distributions . . . or the payment of taxes.”  See id.  
Some courts have noted that a party must assert section 546(e)’s safe harbor as an 
affirmative defense.24  When courts are determining the appropriate application for a safe harbor 
defense, it is proper to draw such a conclusion in the context of a dispositive motion, such as a 
motion for summary judgment.25 If courts were to extend safe harbor protection to fraudulent 
securities schemes, that would utterly undermine the goals of such a provision, which are to 
protect or to promote investor confidence.26  
II. How Should “Settlement Payments” be Defined?  
                                                
20 See id.  
21 See id.  
22 See id.; see also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶546.06[1], at 546-47 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry 
J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009). 
23 See Peter Spero, §4:37 Securities and transactions that implicate financial markets, 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS, PREBANKRUPTCY PLANNING AND EXEMPTIONS (Aug. 2016).   
24 See id.  
25 See supra note 19.  
26 See Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 440 B.R. 243, 267 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010). 
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The term “settlement payment” within section 546(e) is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 741(8).27  
Section 741(8) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a settlement payment is a “preliminary 
settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement 
payment on account, a final settlement payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in 
the securities trade.”28  This broad, non-descriptive definition causes substantial sources of 
tension when defining the safe harbor’s scope.29 Courts have noted that the settlement payment 
definition from section 741(8) is merely “unhelpful” because of its “inherent circularity.”30  
a. “Settlement Payments” Shall be Read According to the Plain Meaning 
The definition of settlement payment should not be restricted because the intended 
purpose of the definition was meant to be broad; the plain meaning of the words from section 
546(e) should be utilized.31 According to most courts, the text of section 741(8) is “plain and 
unambiguous.”32  
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. 
had to decide whether section 546(e) would extend to issuer’s redemption payments for its 
commercial paper prior to maturity.33 Between October 25, 2001 and November 6, 2001, Enron 
paid out more than $1.1 billion to retire certain unsecured and uncertified commercial paper prior 
to maturity.34 However, there was an offering memoranda accompanying the commercial paper 
                                                
27 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2012).  
28 Id.  
29 See Jonathan S. Feldmen, Joshua A. Marcus, and Elan A. Gershoni, Recent Developments in 
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, NORTON J. BANKR. L. AND PRAC. (2012).   
30 See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1990); see 
also Geltzer v. Mooney (In re MacMenamin’s Grill Ltd.), 450 B.R. 414, 422 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 21, 2011); see also Feldmen, Marcus & Gershoni, supra note 29.  
31 See In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., 651 F.3d 330.   
32 See id.  
33 See id.  
34 Id. at 331.   
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that indicated that the notes were not redeemable prior to maturity.35 But Enron redeemed the 
commercial paper before it’s moment of maturity at the accrued par value, plus accrued interest, 
making the redemption price higher than the paper’s market value.36 The Court found that 
because Enron’s redemption payments fell within the “plain language” of section 741(8), those 
payments were protected by section 546(e)’s safe harbor defense.37 The Court noted that Enron 
completed a transaction that involved the “exchange of money for securities,” which satisfies the 
meaning of a settlement payment pursuant to section 741(8).38  
The District Court in In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., discussed “five key factors 
to determine the applicability of the safe harbor defense to any particular transaction” that Judge 
Marrero declared in Jackson v. Mishkin (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.).39 The five key 
factors are as follows: (1) the transactions have long settled by means of actual transfers of 
consideration, so that subsequent reversal of the trade may result in disruption of the securities 
industry, creating a potential chain reaction that could threaten collapse of the affected market; 
(2) consideration was paid out in exchange for securities or property interest as part of a 
settlement of the transaction; (3) the transfer of cash or securities effected contemplates 
consummation of a securities transaction; (4) the transfers were made to financial intermediaries 
involved in the national clearance and settlement system; (5) the transactions implicated 
participants in the system of intermediaries and guarantees which characterize the clearing and 
                                                
35 Id.   
36 Id.   
37 Id. at 333–35.   
38 Id. 
39 See In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., 422 B.R. 423 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. Nov. 20, 2009); 
Jackson v. Mishkin (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.), 263 B.R. 406 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. June 
11, 2001).   
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settlement process of public markets and create the potential for adverse impacts on the 
functioning of the securities market if any of those guarantees in the chain were involved.40  
Generally, the phrase in section 741(8), “commonly used in the securities industry,” is 
read as only modifying the words “any other similar payment.”41 The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. reasoned that the “rule of last 
antecedent” helped conclude how to interpret the phrase “commonly used in the securities trade” 
because that rule informs us that a limiting clause or phrase should be read as modifying only the 
phrase that it immediately follows.42 Additionally, it has been established that such a phrase was 
not meant to limit the way in which “settlement payments” could be defined, but rather a 
“catchall phrase intended to underscore the breadth of the section 546(e) exemption.”43   
b. Leveraged Buyouts are “Settlement Payments” Pursuant to Section 
546(e), Even when Privately Traded 
 
To further extend the breadth of not restricting the definition of “settlement payments,” 
courts have found that leveraged buyouts will also qualify for section 546(e) protection.44 
Further, the statutory definition of “settlement payment” should not be limited and will 
sometimes apply to privately held trading securities.45  
In Contemporary Indus. Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that 
“nothing in the relevant statutory language suggests Congress intended to exclude these 
payments from the statutory definition of ‘settlement payment’ simply because the stock at issue 
                                                
40 See id.  
41 See In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., 651 F.3d. at 335.   
42 See id.   
43 See id. at 336. 
44 See In re QSI Holdings, Inc., 571 F.3d at 547; Kaiser Steel Corp., 913 F.2d at 846. 
45 See Contemporary Indus. Corp v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2009).   
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was privately held.”46 Additionally, this court noted that the phrase “or any other similar payment 
commonly used in the securities trades” evinces Congress’ intent to incorporate a “catchall 
phrase” to emphasize the expansive breadth of section 546(e) exemptions.47 It must be 
recognized that “where statutory language is plain and does not lead to an absurd result, we must 
enforce it as written.”48  
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in In re QSI Holdings, Inc., was presented 
with an issue that involved a leveraged buyout of the debtor’s store.  571 F.3d at 547.  The court 
had to determine whether section 546(e) would apply to such privately traded securities.  Id.  The 
plaintiff in this case sought to “avoid and recover the leveraged buyout transfers as 
constructively fraudulent conveyances.”  Id. at 548.  However, the defendants asserted that 
because the leveraged buyouts were settlement payments made by a financial institution, the 
proceeding should be dismissed because these payments were exempt from avoidance under 
section 546(e).  Id.  When determining how to best read section 546(e), the court noted to first 
look at the text, and if the language is plain, “the sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it 
according to its terms.” and that there was “nothing in the text of section 546(e) precludes its 
application to settlement payments involving privately held securities.”  Id. at 549–50.  
Therefore, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that leveraged buyouts fell 
within the definition of settlement payments and that those payments were protected by the safe 
harbor defense, even if the company was privately traded.  See id.; see also Contemporary Indus. 
Corp., 564 F.3d 981. 
                                                
46 Id.   
47 See id.   
48 Id. at 987. 
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Although many courts have reemphasized expansive definitions for the terminology 
within section 546(e), it is important to be aware that some courts seek to restrict the terminology 
and limit the breadth of section 546(e).  For example, in another case decided by the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the court sought to limit the application of section 546(e) to 
publicly traded securities and not privately traded securities.49 However, the facts of that case 
lacked “many of the indicia of transactions” to qualify as a transaction “commonly used in the 
securities trade,”50 and being a transaction “commonly used in the securities trade” is a necessary 
aspect to qualify as a “settlement payment” under section 546(e)’s safe harbor defense.  
III. Courts Must Consider “Actual Knowledge” When Determining Whether to 
Apply the Safe Harbor Defense 
 
Actual knowledge is “direct and clear knowledge” that “implies a high level of certainty 
and absence of any substantial doubt regarding the existence of a fact.”51 However, establishing 
one’s “actual knowledge” is rather difficult to prove because it is challenging to pinpoint exactly 
what someone knew or did not know.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as well as the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, has restricted a trustee’s ability to avoid and recover 
transfers.52 In light of the safe harbor defense pursuant to section 546(e), “the trustee may only 
avoid and recover intentional fraudulent transfers under section 548(a)(1)(A) made within two 
years of the filing date, unless the transferee had actual knowledge of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, or 
                                                
49 See In re QSI Holdings, Inc., 571 F.3d at 550 (citing In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc., 367 
B.R. 68, 79 (Bank. E.D.N.Y. 2007).   
50 See id. 
51 Picard v. Avellino (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC) 557 B.R. 89, 113 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2016); Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 515 B.R. 
117, 138 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2014); Picard v. Legacy Capital Ltd. (In re Bernard L. 
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC) 548 B.R. 13, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2016). 
52 See Legacy Capital Ltd. (In re BLMIS), 548 B.R. 13; see also Avellino (In re Bernard L. 
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC) 557 B.R. 89. 
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more generally, ‘actual knowledge that there were no actual securities transactions being 
conducted.’”53  
Pursuant to section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee may avoid any 
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property that was made or incurred within two years of the 
petition filing date if the debtor, voluntarily or involuntarily, made such transfer with the actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor.54 The breakdown of the requirements for a trustee 
to establish such an action are as follows: (1) the debtor transferred an interest in property or 
incurred a debt; (2) on or within two years before the petition filing date; (3) with actual intent to 
delay, defraud, or hinder a present or future creditor.55  
Further, if a trustee files a claim under section 548(a)(1)(A), then the section 546(e) 
defense is unavailable.56 A transferee who has actual knowledge of fraudulent transfers, i.e., a 
Ponzi scheme, cannot avail itself of the section 546(e) safe harbor defense.57 A Ponzi scheme is 
defined as “a fraudulent arrangement in which an entity makes payments to investors from 
monies obtained from later investors rather than any ‘profits’ of the underlying business 
venture.”58 Such fraud consists of “funneling proceeds received from new investors to previous 
investors in the guise of profits from the alleged business venture, thereby cultivating an illusion 
that a legitimate profit-making business opportunity exists and inducing further investment.”59 
Essentially, transfers made in furtherance of Ponzi schemes are sufficient to establish that the 
                                                
53 See Legacy Capital Ltd. (In re BLMIS), 548 B.R. at 28.   
54 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).   
55 Id.  
56 See Spero, supra note 23.  
57 See Merkin (In re BLMIS), 515 B.R. at 138.   
58 See Kathleen March, Alan Ahart and Janet Shapiro, H. Avoidance of Fraudulent Transfers and 
Debts (11 U.S.C. § 548), CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: BANKR. (2016).   
59 Id.  
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transfer was fraudulent and to illustrate that the transferor did have intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud creditors.60  
Ultimately, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code provided a limitation on safe harbor 
defense through section 548(a)(1)(A) by indicating that any avoidance action that concerns 
transfers made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud will be exempt from safe harbor 
protection under section 546(e).61  
IV. Second Circuit Courts Will Dismiss a Transferee’s Motion to Dismiss via Safe 
Harbor Protection if the Transferee has Actual Knowledge of Fraud 
 
The issue of whether safe harbor protection should apply to transfers made by Bernard L. 
Madoff Investment Securities’ (“BLMIS”) accounts to its investment advisory customers was 
hotly contested for several years.62 Over the years, several courts have found that section 546(e) 
is inapplicable in situations where a trustee is seeking to avoid transfers that were made to further 
fraudulent activities.63   
The safe harbor defense will not be available to a transferee who had actual knowledge of 
fictitious activity.64 In Picard v. Katz, the Bankruptcy court “implicitly suggested” that those who 
were actual participants in the fraud would not be “entitled to invoke the protections of section 
546(e) because, unlike innocent customers, they could not have believed that settlement 
payments were entirely bona fide.”65  
                                                
60 See id. 
61 See Hoskins v. Citigroup, Inc. (In re Viola), 469 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2012).   
62 See, e.g., Picard v. Estate of Mendelow (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 506 B.R. 
208, 222 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016).   
63 See Picard v. Avellino, 557 B.R. 89; Picard v. Merkin, 515 B.R. 117; Picard v. Legacy Capital 
Ltd., 548 B.R. 13; Sec. Inv’r. Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 12 MC 
115(JSR), 2013 WL 1609154 S.D.N.Y. 2013); Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 27, 2011); see also Warren, Recent Developments in Section 546(e) Safe Harbor Litigation. 
64 See Sec. Inv’r. Protection Corp. 2013 WL 1609154 at *4. 
65 Id.; see Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447.   
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It is important for judges to bear in mind that the goal of section 546(e) is to protect the 
reasonable expectations of bona fide investors who believed that they were signing legitimate 
securities contracts.66 However, a transferee who had actual knowledge that Madoff’s BLMIS 
was a Ponzi scheme did not have any such expectations, other than the desire to obtain greater 
rates of monetary return while he or she could.67 That is why courts were reluctant to grant safe 
harbor protection to BLMIS transferees who were found to have had actual knowledge of the 
fraudulent circumstances.   
The court in Sec. Inv’r Protection Corp. acknowledged that a defendant cannot be 
permitted to “launder what he or she knows to be fraudulently transferred funds through a 
nominal third party and still obtain the protections of section 546(e).”68 Therefore, the court 
established that once a trustee sufficiently establishes that a transferee has actual knowledge of a 
fraudulent transfer, that transferee cannot assert safe harbor protection.69 Additionally, if a 
transferee has actual knowledge of such fraud, the transferee’s motion to dismiss the claims on 
the basis of the safe harbor defense must be denied.70  
V. Cases that Illustrate Preclusions of Safe Harbor Defense Due to Defendants 
Actual Knowledge of Fraud 
 
There are many cases where courts have outright held that a transferee will be precluded 
from taking advantage of the safe harbor defense if that individual had actual knowledge of 
fraudulent activity.  It is important to know the particular facts of a situation because a court will 
consider all relevant facts and circumstances when determining whether to grant a transferee safe 
harbor protection, especially if the situation involves allegedly fraudulent acts.  
                                                
66 See Sec. Inv’r. Protection Corp. 2013 WL 1609154 at *4. 
67 See id.   
68 Id. at *7.   
69 See id.   
70 See id. at *10. 
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In the Bankruptcy Court’s second major decision in the long list of BLMIS-related cases, 
the court set a precedent for these proceedings that certain “fraudulent transfer claims relating to 
distributions” would not be protected by section 546(e) safe harbor defense.71 The court for 
Picard v. Madoff (In re BLMIS) rejected arguments that “BLMIS was a stockbroker ‘engaged in 
the business of effecting transactions in securities’” because it was evident that those engaged in 
a Ponzi scheme did not make legitimate “securities transactions happen.”72 Through BLMIS, 
Madoff never “purchased any of the securities he claimed to have purchased for customer 
accounts.”73 Furthermore, the court concluded that BLMIS payments did not constitute 
satisfactory “settlement payments” worthy of safe harbor protection.  See id. Moreover, the court 
noted that such settlement payments “must be made in the context of real securities transactions, 
not fake ones.”74  
Recently, in Avellino (In re BLMIS), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that actual knowledge of any fraudulent nature of security 
trading will preclude a transferee from using the safe harbor defense of section 546(e).75 This 
case illustrated particular facts of a situation where a court disallowed the safe harbor defense 
because of the particular involvement transferees had with fraudulent activity.  
Avellino and Bienes (collectively, “the defendants”) were accountants who were actively 
involved with Madoff and BLMIS.76 The defendants tracked returns and side payments, and 
                                                
71 Picard v. Madoff (In re BLMIS) 458 B.R. 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011); Legacy 
Capital Ltd. (In re BLMIS), 548 B.R. 13; Avellino (In re BLMIS) 557 B.R. 89.   
72 See Picard v. Madoff, 458 B.R. at 115.   
73 See id.   
74 See id. 
75 See Avellino, 557 B.R. 89.   
76 See id. at 102.  
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commanded BLMIS employees how to allocate payments amongst specific accounts.77 The 
money was paid to these accounts through fictitious payments that amounted to a specific 
predetermined dollar amount that guaranteed a particular rate of return.78 Ultimately, the court 
considered those actions and the extent of the defendants’ actual knowledge of Madoff’s Ponzi 
scheme, as well as their direct and active participation on such fictitious payments, and 
ultimately determined that the defendants were not entitled to the safe harbor protection.79  
Subsequent to Avellino (In re BLMIS), the court analyzed issues with an extremely 
similar factual situation.  In Estate of Mendelow (In re BLMIS), the court again had to determine 
whether it was appropriate to award a transferee the safe harbor defense.80 Like Avellino and 
Bienes, Mendelow was also an accountant who opened accounts at BLMIS for himself, his 
family, and various clients.81 Allegedly, Mendelow was close with Madoff and there were 
records of numerous phone calls that occurred between Mendelow and BLMIS.82 Additionally, 
Mendelow’s name and phone number were written in Madoff’s address book.83 Mendelow 
received particularly high rates of return that consistently met pre-determined rates.84 Ultimately, 
Mendelow knew that these types of return rates were impossible if Madoff was actually involved 
in legitimate trading securities.85 Like Avellino and Bienes, Mendelow was actively involved in 
ensuring that his accounts met the pre-determined guaranteed rate of return.86 Further, like 
Avellino’s and Bienes’ payments, Mendelow’s payments were ensured through fictitious 
                                                
77 See id.   
78 See id. at 102, 116.   
79 See id. at 116–19. 
80 See Estate of Mendelow (In re BLMIS), 560 B.R. 208.   
81 Id. at 213–14.   
82 Id. at 214.   
83 Id.   
84 Id. at 215.   
85 Id.   
86 Id. at 226.   
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trades.87 Like the court in Avellino (In re BLMIS), the court here held that the facts of the 
situation illustrated that Mendelow had actual knowledge that BLMIS was not engaged in actual 
trading securities, and that there was apparent evidence that fictitious trading was frequently 
occurring.88  
Conclusion 
   Various courts disagree about whether the language of section 546(e) is ambiguous or 
whether the statute is clear on its face.89 Generally, the types of payments that allow a party to 
invoke the safe harbor defense are broad.  The explicit definition of the term “settlement 
payment,” defined in section 741(8) is qualified by a catchall phrase that encompasses a broad 
breadth of payments that can satisfy implementation of the safe harbor defense.  However, that is 
not to say that there are no limitations imposed on the implementation of section 546(e)’s safe 
harbor defense.   
Although not always, there are circumstances where the safe harbor defense may not be asserted 
for fictitious payments; for example, the Second Circuit has found that when a transferee has 
actual knowledge of the fraudulent activity, the safe harbor defense will not apply.  Throughout 
the years, there have been debates and contentious case proceedings involving the issue of what 
to make of transferees who were involved with fraudulent security trading; particularly, whether 
the transfers made by BLMIS to the investment advisory customers were protected by the safe 
harbor defense of section 546(e).  The Second Circuit courts have continuously disallowed 
section 546(e) safe harbor protection for individuals involved in Ponzi scheme activity, or other 
forms of fraudulent activity, and will fully consider the extent of one’s knowledge in the activity 
                                                
87 Id.   
88 See id. at 225–26. 
89 See Resnick & Sommer, supra note 22.  
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when determining whether safe harbor will be granted.  Ultimately, it appears, at least for the 
Second Circuit, that when there is actual knowledge of fraudulent transfers, and there actually is 
no involvement with trading securities, a transferee will not be allowed to utilize the safe harbor 
defense.  
